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Family farming had been an integral component of United 
States agricultural policy from the Revolutionary period 
through the latter part of the twentieth century. The role 
of the U,S, government increased tremendously following the 
Great Depression. However. the family farm began to be 
replaced by industrial agribusiness by the late 1370s, 
In 1981 the Department of Agriculture published a report 
stating that government policies v/ould have to be revamped 
in order to reverse the trend tov/ards industrial 
agribusiness. By the end of the 1980s it had become 
apparent that family farming occupied a diminished role in 
overall agricultural production. Thus, a choice had been 
made to replace family farms with industrial agribusiness as 
the major component in terms of overall U.S. agricultural 
production 
The 199 5 farm bill made tremendous changes in U.S. farm 
policy. The stated intent is to end government involvement 
in agricultural policy. There are many implications 
associated with this action. The transition from family 
farming to industrial agribusiness has led to tremendous 
concentration in both production and marketing. 
Additionally, agribusiness farming practices have far 
greater ecological impacts than the methods employed by 
family farmers, 
As a result of these developments at the federal level, 
state governments, and elements in the private sector, have 
intervened. Consequently, there have been attempts to 
bolster opportunities for potential family farmers. 
However, entry into farming still requires an enormous 
amount of capital. This is a situation that is quite a 
contrast to the predicament faced by farmers of previous 
generat ions. 
Family farmers, and the opportunity to be one, have become 
almost non-existent. This development ushers in a new era 
in agriculture. Many of the consequences have been 
predicted, and others will evolve as the end of government 
involvement in agriculture moves closer. Regardless, for 
present and future generations, a freedom has been lost 
which dates back to the Revolutionary Period, the freedom to 
farm, 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Historians tell us that when Thomas Jefferson penned 
the words ''life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,'' 
(Brodie 1974, p.122) he had in mind a nation of farmer-
artisans ov/ning land and profiting from it in an environment 
that af forded economic oppor tunity to the common man and not 
just the landed gentry, Jefferson believed that America was 
best represented as a country of yeoman farmers. ''Those 
who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if 
ever he had a chosen people'' (Ibid, p.156), Jefferson felt 
that it was in the best interests of democracy for citizens 
to be able to obtain farmland. Throughout Jefferson's time, 
one of his great concerns v/as how this issue v/ould be 
handled in the future (Ibid, p.116). 
By the latter part of the twentieth century the federal 
government had become heavily involved in agricultural 
policy, This thesis examines U.S. agricultural policy 
regarding the family farm during the 1980s and 1990s, The 
point of this project is to study the policy choices that 
were made and examine the ramifications of these choices, as 
it relates to the family farm. Furthermore, this study 
explores the choices that were made that ultimately spelled 
doom for the family farm. 
The idea that the Government has encouraged the notion 
of small independent farmers can be traced back to the 
1 
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revolutionary era. From the Ordinance of 178 7 through the 
Homestead Act of 1863 and culminating in the Reclamation Act 
of 1902. the principal federal role was to make land easily 
accessible to would-be farmers. Throughout this period, the 
policy of the nation v/as more or less well-understood: 
disperse publicly ov/ned lands to small and modest-sized 
landov/ners who vrould operate the nation's farms as yeoman 
farmers-oVi'ner-operators (Strange 1988, p,14), As a result, 
the United States accomplished the largest transfer of 
national resources to the common citizens the v/orld has ever 
known f Farm .Journal 19 95, p,32J. 
The Great Depression was responsible for expanding the 
role of the federal government in agricultural policy. In 
1933, direct government intervention in agricultural markets 
was accomplished v^ith the passage of the Agriculture 
Adjustment Act, Through the "Triple A,'' as it is 
sometimes called, the government sought to help farmers 
survive through difficult times (Kilborn 1984, p.23[A];t. 
The passage of the Act benefited family farms in a new 
manner because, as one scholar of the period puts it, "an 
overwhelming majority of the country's six million farms 
were still family operations.... A central ambition in the 
Roosevelt program was to keep as many families on the land 
as possible" (Worster 1979, p.155). 
Follov/ing the 1930s, farm sizes increased and ov/nership 
concentrated in fev/er hands. Through the 1970s the majority 
of farms were ov/ned and operated by family farmers, In 
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1978, non-family farms accounted for only 7 percent of total 
agricultural sales (Krause 1983. p.22). However, a mere 
decade later, over half the food in the U.S. was produced on 
4 percent of non-family farms (Strange 1988, p.41), 
This transition from family farming to industrial 
agribusiness occurred in a decade. A 1981 United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) report, entitled A Time to 
Choose. predicted such a transformation. It offered 
direction to policymakers v/ho v/ere to decide the future of 
American agriculture. 
It has become increasingly evident that 
the gains to the Nation that remain to 
be captured from the continued shift to 
larger- and larger farming operations have 
become smaller over time. We have passed 
the point where any net gain to society 
can be claimed from policies that 
encourage large farms to become larger 
(U.S,D,A, 1981,p,142). 
At the same time, several studies demonstrated 
v/idespread public support for the concept of the family 
farm. According to a Lou Harris poll taken in the late 
1970s, the public's preference was for a ''country which has 
a relatively large number of small farms,'' Significantly, 
there is a broad-based consensus on this issue, with strong 
support for the family farm in evidence in every region of 
the country and in every significant demographic subgroup of 
the population'' (U.S.D.A, 1981, p.16). 
Approximately a decade later, another nationv/ide surve-y 
showed continued support for family farming. The authors of 
this study operated from the premise that "because 
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agricultural policies represent significant cost to the 
consumers and taxpayers, the issue was hov/ far the public 
was willing to support special policies to save the family 
farm'' (Epperson, Jordan, and Variyam 1990. p,257). Nearly 
53 percent of the public thought saving the family farm was 
more important than obtaining greater efficiency in food 
production. Only 26.3 percent stated a preference for 
greater efficiency Over 57 percent thought that the 
government should have a special policy to preserve family 
farms (Ibid, p.259). 
It appears that government policy, at least until the 
late 1970s, 'was in agreement with public sentiment, Yet in 
1994 it was predicted that by the year 2010 only 360.000 
farms would account for four-fifths of farm output. 
Additionally, the operators and families on those farms 
v/ould account for only 0.5 percent of the nation's 
population (Tweeten 1994, p,24[C]), This situation paints a 
picture that is quite a contrast to the Jeffersonian vision 
of American agriculture, Thus the question becomes, hov/ did 
agriculture policy change so dramatically despite a public 
preference for family farms and, at the same time, against 
the recommendations of the government's own experts v/ho 
stated in A Time to Choose that it seemed fairly certain 
that the (then) future economic climate, combined with a 
continuation of past policies and programs, would continue, 
and even accelerate, the shift to large and super-large 
farms. Therefore, the study concluded, unless policies and 
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programs are changed so that they counter, instead of 
reinforce and accelerate the trends tov/ards ever-larger 
farming operations, the result will be a few large farms 
controlling food production (U.S.D.A 1981, p,142). 
Chapter Two begins the process of explaining this 
situation, However. before turning to that chapter, it 
v/ould be useful to define a number of the terms used in this 
thesis. Perhaps the most di f ficult and confusing problem 
Vv'ithin this thesis, and agricultural policy, is to render-
precise the term ''family farm,'' 
The term is a broad label,,,. Over the 
years, policy-makers, economists, 
sociologists, and many others have attempted 
to define the family farm to use it as a 
program-directing tool, The testimony at 
public meetings reaffirmed previous findings 
that broad agreement on a definition of 
family farm-by acreage, income, sales, 
legal form, or any other readily available 
measurement is impossible for the purpose 
of economic and policy analysis and perhaps 
for program implement.ation also. . , , But the 
ideas behind the symbol, the values attached 
to it, reflect many, if not most, of the 
goals Americans of all occupations and 
backgrounds seek in food and agricultural 
policy (U,S,D,A, 1981, p,16), 
However, despite the obvious difficulties, A Time to 
Choose identified three major types of farms: rural 
residences, primary farms, and megafarms. It should be 
noted that officially, a farm is defined as a place that 
sells at least $1,000 worth of agricultural products a year 
[King 1984 , p,12[A]) . 
'•Rural residences'' are made up of farms that make 
less than $40,000 a year. These are operations v/ith little 
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production and high off-farm incomes. In 1981 these "rural 
residences'' made up 44.4 percent of all places counted as 
farms, Most of these farms produce too little to be able to 
rely fully or primarily on farming for a livelihood; they 
must depend on supplemental, non farm income, It is not 
unti1 a farm achieves around $40,000 in gross sales that 
farm income alone begins to approach an amount considered 
adequate for an acceptable standard of living (U.S.D.A. 
1981, p,44), 
''Primary farms'' generate more than $40,000 in gross 
sales and their operators depend primarily upon farming for 
their incomes (U,S,D,A, 1981, p,46). About seven eighths of 
all farm output is produced on farms which market over 
$40,000 in sales (Strange 19 88, p.82). 
The third group, ''mega farms, '' constitutes the farms 
with sales over $200,000 yearly. Since A Time to r.hnose v/as 
v/ritten, this group is sometimes divided into two groups; 
those v/ith sales over $200,000 yearly, and with sales over 
$5 00,0 00 yearly, 
Defining farms by income is a simple Vv'ay to ansv/er the 
problem of identifying farm groups. In order to better 
define the terms the following illustrates what might be 
described as the extremes of the types of farms found in the 
United States, 
Family farming (primary farming) tends to be 
ovfner-operated, entrepreneurial, dispersed, 
diversified, at equal advantage in open 
markets, family centered, technologically 
progressive, striving for production 
processes in harmony with nature, resource 
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conserving, farming as a way of life 
(Strange 1988, p. 34). 
Industrial agribusiness (megafarms) tends to 
be industrially organized, financed for 
grov/th, large scale, concentrated, 
specialized, management centered, capital-
intensive, at an advantage in controlled 
markets, standardized iu production 
processes, resource consumptive, farmed 
as a business (Ibid, p.38), 
The issue here is the character of rural life and the 
organization of a major sector of the economy—a sector that 
resonates to the very basis of American life. Agriculture 
constitutes the last vestige of small-scale enterprise and 
widespread ovi^nership of productive assets in American 
society (Ibid, p,251), The family farm has long held a 
central place in American politics and society. It is more 
than one interest among many; it is a special commitment 
Americans made, dating back to the founders 
In order to better understand the family farm 
situation, in the 1980s and 1990s, it is helpful to set the 
background by analyzing the early 1970s. Chapter Tv/o 
examines this time period, 
CHAPTER TWO 
SETTING THE BACKGROUND 
The Seventies 
The events that lead to the farm crisis of the 1980s 
were set in motion in 1973 , Several events had combined to 
produce a decrease in overall world food production. In 
1971 and 1972 there was a severe cirought in Africa and a 
rice crop failure in Korea and other parts of Asia (Morgan 
1980, p.213), 
At the same time. President Richard Nixon was pursuing 
new foreign markets for U.S. agricultural commodities. In 
1972 Nixon went to China on his historic mission. 
Concurrently, Japan began to buy American agricultural 
products, especially grains. By 1981 Japan purchased over 
three-fourths of its corn from the United States (Strange 
1988, p.18). U.S. grain shipments increased from 34 million 
tons in 1971 to 82 million tons by 1975. In addition, U.S. 
earnings from its agricultural exports grew from $7.7 
billion to $21.3 billion (Morgan 1980, p.39). 
The American wheat inventory (the average amount of 
v^heat stored for future sale throughout the year) stood at a 
comfortable 23.5 million tons in 1972. Just over a year 
later, that inventory had slipped to under 7 million tons 
(Ibid, p.214). In turn, the price of U.S. farm products 
increased due to the declining inventory. From 1972 to 1974 
the price of wheat went up 132 percent, from $1.76 to $4.09 
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a bushel . Corn v/as up 9 2 percent and soybeans 5 2 percent in 
the same period (USDA 1984. p. 18). 
From the Depression through the 1960s farming was 
mostly a domestic matter. Exports to foreign markets never 
exceeded $7 billion, so American farmers were largely 
insulated from the buffetings of world markets. 
Agricultural exports, only $7,3 billion in 1970, grev/ to 
$43,8 billion by 1981 (Kilborn 1984, p,22[A]), 
Betv/een 1950 and 1970, U.S. v/heat exports increased 
from 10 to almost 20 million tons, and corn exports from 2.5 
to 12.5 million tons. Then betv/een 1971 and 1975, the 
increase in the international trade nearly equaled the 
growth in the whole previous postwar period. Global trade 
in wheat, corn, rice, sorghum, barley, oats, and rye grevv' by 
50 percent (from 114 to 157 million tons), and America 
supplied most of the increase (Morgan 1980, p,214), 
Mixon's 1971 devaluation of the dollar also encouraged 
the export of agricultural commodities (Ibid, p.213). The 
decision to let the dollar ''float" in foreign exchange 
markets effectively lowered the price of U.S. products and 
made American exports more competitive at precisely the same 
time foreign demand increased dramatically (U.S.D.A. 1981, 
p.24j, 
In 197 4, as export demand boomed, crops failed in many 
regions throughout the world. Agricultural experts turned 
from the old problems of trying to restrain production and 
manage surpluses, to worrying about how to feed a hungry 
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world (Robbins 1985, p,21[A]). For example, the Soviet 
Union began to buy large amounts of U.S. grain. 
Farmers, at the urging of the Department of 
Agriculture, planted fields hardly broken from the great 
dust bov/1 of the thirties (Gussow 1981, p.128). Seeking to 
maximize U.S. farm output in the face of a strong export 
market, the federal government did away v/ith acreage set-
asides for major crops. In 1974 four million acres of 
former grassland in the Great Plains had been plowed up and 
seeded to grain following the massive Russian v/heat purchase 
of 1972, when the per bushel price shot up to almost $6.00. 
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz urged farmers to plant 
fence row to fence row (Worster 1980, p.231). Between 1973 
and 1981, the number of acres planted to crops on U.S. farms 
increased by 12 percent, from 316 million to 353 million 
acres (USDA 1984, p.2). 
This increase in acreage was accompanied by another 
development-farmland prices increased. The value of 
farmland more than quadrupled, from $176 bi11 ion in 1970 to 
$715 billion in 1981, but the debt borrowed against it rose 
almost as fast, from $29 billion to $96 billion (Strange 
1988, p.22). 
Ever-present experts in government, the 
universities, and the farm trade publications 
were advising farmers to expand their 
operations (Strange, 1988 p.19). The practice 
of borrovv'ing against what one already owns in 
order to buy more is called leverage. 
Leveraged buying became the hallmark of 
excellence in the 1970s, Consultants 
recommended it, farm magazines touted 
its virtues, agricultural colleges wrote 
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fine reports demonstrating its v/isdom, A 
progressive farmer was a highly leveraged 
farmer who knev/ hov^ to manage money 
(Ibid, p.20), 
This situation was acceptable as long as farm production 
kept its balance with the rapidly expanding demand for the 
U.S. export market. 
Hov/ever the agricultural outlook began to dim in the 
late 1970s. Farm production had already outstripped foreign 
demand so much so that by 1977 the falling prices of key 
export crops, especially wheat, corn, and cotton, were 
creating significant problems for farmers (Ibid, p.99). In 
addition, some U.S, trading partners were increasing their 
production, partially because of the introduction of green 
revolution technology, or because Lesser Developed Countries 
(LDC's) v/ere burdened by debts that made an increase in 
their domestic production a necessary priority. As the 
dollar strengthened, and federal price supports rem.ained in 
place, U,S, crops became too expensive for many potential 
customers, further intensifying the impact of each of these 
factors (Miller 1988, p.256), 
The cumulative effect of this chain of events was 
created as a result of policies that overstimulated 
investments through the 1970s, and other governmental 
actions that then brought on a credit squeeze. For farmers, 
the groundwork Vv'as laid through financial policies of 
government institutions, such as the Federal Reserve Board 
and the Farmers Home Administration, v/hich permitted 
12 
borrov/ing at interest rates that were lower than the rate of 
inflation through the 1970s (Robbins 1985, p.20[A]), This 
public subsidy predictably increased farm borrov/ing—to its 
highest level ever-precisely at a time when subsidies should 
have been falling (Riemenschneider 1985, p,3[A]). 
In response to these developments, the Carter 
administration implemented several policy changes, but none 
of these satisfactorily addressed the major structural 
problems. In the judgment of one scholar, ''no overall 
change in federal policy came. Instead the government 
responded with a temporary program to pay farmers not to 
plant a portion of their fields, and an expanded program of 
federal credit. The latter was exactly what wasn't needed'' 
(Strange 19 88, p.23). 
Another development emerged during the 1970s. A period 
of rapid centralization was underway in an industry that had 
resisted such a move much more successfully than most other 
American industries. Most farm failures mean another farm's 
growth; two out of every three farmland purchases expanded 
existing farms. Sped up by the farm depression, this 
process doubled the average farm size in just three decades 
(Lappe 1985 , p.19[A]) . 
Whereas previous decades had seen larger family farms 
consolidate smaller operations, this transition brought 
agriculture into the era of agribusiness. In addition, the 
Department of Agriculture projected that by the year 2000, 
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half the farm products v/ould come from the top 1 percent of 
U.S. farms (Lin, Coffman, and Penn 1980, p,13). 
But even if the crucial transition, from family farming 
to industrial agribusiness, occurred in the 1980s, the 
conditions that drove it had begun to emerge long before. 
Following the Great Depression, the emphasis in agriculture 
has been to ''get big or get out'' (Berry 1977, p,41). 
Proponents of the new agricultural technology argued that 
increased productivity v/ould produce rural depopulation as a 
positive result. For example, it v/as argued that a 
retooling of federal policy would have as one of its 
accomplishments a reduction in the number of people needed 
to feed the nation and produce exports. This viewpoint 
seemed particularly strong during the 19 70s. Nixon's 
Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, often espoused the 
principle of concentrated farming among large holders. 
'"Each American farmer now feeds himself and fifty-six 
others. ... 96 percent of America's manpov/er is freed from 
food production'' (Ibid, p.32), For example, between 1950 
and 1955 more than a million workers migrated out of the 
agricultural sector and into other sectors of the economy 
(Ibid, p,162 ) . 
The concept of ''get big or get out'' v/as slowly 
altering the makeup of U,S, farms. Since the early 1960s, 
the basic structure of American agriculture has been 
changing. Family-owned farms have grown larger and larger, 
and the total area under cultivation expanded. The costs of 
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operating these spreads have grov/n proportionately, and 
farmers became some of the countries largest individual 
borrowers (King 19 8 5, p.7[A]). 
By 1978, there were 2,5 million farms occupied by less 
than four percent of the country's population. The largest 
20 percent of those farms, by sales, accounted for four out 
of every five dollars produced. Observers, hov/ever, were 
pointing to presvsures on the "disappearing middle,'' the 
group of medium-sized places between the big operations and 
the part-tim^e farms (U.S.D.A. 1981, p. 6). 
As a result of the growing farm problem. President 
Carter's Secretary of Agriculture, Bob Bergland, 
commissioned a study to examine the situation. In 1981 the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) published its 
report, A Time to Chnnse. 
The study examined how much net farm income varied by 
farm size during selected periods since 1960, It found that 
farms v/ith sales over $100,000 had 50 percent greater 
variability in income during the period 1962-72 than any 
group of smaller farms, and tvy'ice as much variability in the 
period 1973-78. They concluded that overall instability in 
farm income was increasing in American agriculture. The 
problem was particularly acute for larger farms because of 
their greater reliance on purchased inputs and higher fixed 
costs (Strange 1988, p.116). 
The study argued that mega farms trade labor for 
capital, with no improvement in production efficiencies. 
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They contributed to rural unemployment, v/hile producing no 
corresponding decrease in food costs. The study concluded: 
''We have passed the point v^here any net gain to society can 
be claimed from policies that encourage large farms to 
become larger'' (Brown 1983. p.30[A]). 
The study reworked existing calculations on economies 
of scale in agriculture and reconfirmed their findings: by 
the time a farm is large enough to produce $45,000 worth of 
farms goods per year, it is already 90 percent efficient. 
When it grows to the level of $133,000 in production (still 
a modestly sized farm), it has attained as much efficiency 
gain as it will achieve, even if it grows much larger (Ibid, 
P 30[A]). 
As a result of the greatly changed mix of farm firms 
and their economic characteristics, continuation of past 
programs and policies would likely promote future problems. 
Examples included the continued concentration of economic 
power, inflation in land prices, and unwise use of 
resources, all of this without apparent benefit to the rest 
of society (U.S.D.A, 1981, p.41). 
A Time to Choose argued that the United States was at a 
crossroads. Federal agricultural policy would need to be 
changed in order to encourage the continued existence of the 
family farm, The report stated that powerful forces 
underlied the trends toward concentration, and to slov/ those 
trends v/ould require major changes in agricultural policies. 
More than a single change in a policy or program would be 
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necessary. Instead, it v/ould require numerous changes 
across several areas, all of v/hich must be more carefully 
coordinated and harmonized, But, if the recommended changes 
in the tax code, commodity, credit, resource-conservation, 
research and other programs were made, there would be a 
slowing of the trend towards greater concentration. Slowing 
this trend vrould be beneficial to farmers and consumers, and 
in the best long-term interests of the U.S. (Ibid, p,152). 
The study demonstrated that federal choices faced in 
the 1980s would determine the future of family farming, 
given the significant pressures facing the industry. One of 
the major factors influencing the authors was the 
understanding that in 1978 about 70 percent of those who 
ov/ned farmland were over 50 years old. That land would be 
changing hands in the next 20 or 30 years (Ibid, p.6). This 
large group of aging farmers vrould likely sell their 
holdings. The question v/as v/ho would buy it, corporations 
or family farmers? 
Thg Eighties 
Implementing the changes recommended in the report 
would be up to the incoming President, Ronald Reagan, who 
had been elected in 1980. An indication of the approach his 
Administr.ation would take was hinted when he named John 
Block Secretary of Agriculture. Block exemplified 
industrial agribusiness. As the New York Times described. 
Block ''is a member of an exclusive circle, the 5 percent of 
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the country's farmers v/ho produce half of its agricultural 
output, He is also one of a still smaller group, the 1 
percent that earns nearly two-thirds of all farm income'' 
(Robbins 1981, p,l[A]). 
The Block farm demonstrated the opposite of the 
Jeffersonian agrarian model, instead it represented 
corporate agribusiness. This operation had two managers 
overseeing five employees. Mr, Block said his holding ¥;as 
representative of the large grain and livestock farms, 
although his sales were somewhat higher than the $500,000 
figure commonly used to describe the largest U.S, farms 
(Ibid, p,1[A]), 
Very early on in the Reagan Administration, problems 
began to appear in the agricultural sector of the economy. 
The grov/th in the export market halted, and then began to 
decline. Perhaps for political reasons, some loudly blamed 
Carter's 1979 embargo of grain sales to the Soviet Union 
after its intervention in Af gh.anistan. but that measure Vv'as 
far outdone by other factors. Eventually the Reagan 
administration admitted that the embargo was not a prime 
factor in the collapse of exports (Strange 1988, p.26). 
As exports increased in the 1970s, American farmers had 
become more dependent on export markets. By the 1980s, 
farmers were reliant on exports for half to two-thirds of 
the major grain crops. Without these exports, surpluses 
quickly piled up. prices fell, and farm incomes declined 
(King 1985, p.7[A]). 
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The most immediate problem facing the Reagan 
Administration was the ever grovv-ing stockpile of 
agricultural commodities, From 1973 until 1982, corn in 
storage increased from 484 to 3,120 million bushels, VVheat 
stocks bloated from 340 to 1,515 million bushels (Strange 
1988, p,23). To cushion the effect of declining exports. 
Congress follov/ed the Depression-born formula of controlling 
product ion. In order to decrease production, subsidies were 
tied to reductions in tilled acreage (King 1985, p.7[A]) 
In order to better understand these first years under 
Reagan, a comparison of statistics from 1979 through 1983 
illustrates the effects of the Administration's agricultural 
policies. In 1979, the largest 1 percent of farms 
(megafarms) earned 42.1 percent of all profits. In 1981 the 
top 1 percent of all farms took in 66,3 percent of all farm 
profits. In addition, the only farm group averaging losses 
in 1979 v/as the group (rural residences) v/ith sales under 
$5,000 (Robbins 1983, p.8[A]). 
In 1983 there were 380,000 farmers, representing 16 
percent of all farmers, v/ith sales betv/een $40,000 and 
$100,000, The average income from farming for this group 
was below the poverty level, about $5,500. In addition, 
those with sales betv/een $20,000 and $40,000 earned an 
average $505(Robbins 1983, p,12[B]). At the same time, 
there v/ere 24,000 farms v/ith sales exceeding $500,000 
annually. Representing 1 percent of all farms, they 
accounted for 29 percent of all sales. In addition, they 
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received nearly half of all the profits earned (Kilborn 
1984, p,22[A]), 
A special report from the Office of Technology 
Assessment stated that at the beginning of 1983, 86,6 
percent of the 2.2 million farms were classified as small 
with annual gross sales ranging from $5,000 to $19,900, 
Large farms, v/ith sales from $200,000 to $499,999, made up 
only 4,2 percent of the total and very large farms, those 
with sales of $500,00 or more made up only 1 2 percent 
But the large and very large farms took in 53,5 percent of 
the total cash receipts of all 2,2 million farms, while the 
middle-sized ones received only 19,1 percent (King 1985, 
p.25[A]), 
The Reagan Administration implemented a novel approach 
in agricultural policy in 1983, In order to reduce the 
growing stockpiles of surplus crops, the Administration 
proposed the Payment-In-Kind (PIK) program. Under this 
program, farmers were paid in commodities from existing 
stockpiles, At a cost of nearly $10 billion dollars, the 
program took nearly 80 million acres out of production 
(Kilborn 1984, p,22[A],) In addition. Block, with the 
support of Budget Director David A, Stockman, unsuccessfully 
attempted to eliminate subsidies. Furthermore, Block 
re fused to use some of the special farm aid funds Congress 
had appropriated in 1981, In 1983 a federal court ordered 
Mr, Block to spend the money (King 1983, p,16[B]), 
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In 1984, the Reagan Administration proposed legislation 
to sharply curtail government price supports for farmers. 
The primary proposal was that the Government would help 
farmers only when their commodities fell below 75 percent of 
the average open-market price of the previous five years, 
But the 75 percent support price for each year would be 
established on the basis of the open v/orld market of the 
previous five years. Prices rarely fall to such a level, so 
the system would protect farmers only in periods of the 
sharpest declines (Kilborn 1984, p.4[A]). Critics of the 
Reagan Administration plan stated that a wide open, free-
market policy would force many farmers off the land, leading 
to oligopolies of superfarmers and the collapse of thousands 
of farming communities. Instead, they suggested policies to 
help the primary farmers (Kilborn 1984, p.23[A]j, At the 
same time, legislative remedies that nearly all farmers 
favored, including emergency credit, a moratorium on 
foreclosures, and more stimulation of farm exports were not 
being implemented (King 1983, p.11[A]), 
By .July of 1984, farm income v/as the lowest ever 
recorded in the United States. Total annual net income from 
farming in the previous four years, adjusted for inflation, 
averaged less than one-third that of ten years before, and 
less than half of 1979's (Lewis 1983, p,23[A]). In 
September of 1984 the Reagan Administration instituted a 
$650 million credit relief package, Hov/ever, by February of 
1985. only 21 loans had been approved using $44 mill ion of 
21 
the $650 million authorized (Boyd 1985, p,26[A];i. By the 
end of 1984, farms were failing at a rate of 36 per 1,000, 
more than triple the rate of failure for other businesses 
{Kilborn 1984 , p,22[A]) , 
In a 1985 special report, the Office of Technology 
Assessment found that price support loan programs, which the 
Reagan Administration said pushed up American farm commodity 
prices to uncompetitive levels, tended to provide more 
v/ealth and growth benefits to farms v/ith sales over $200,000 
a year. In contrast, income supports in the form of 
subsidies, which the Administration v/anted to phase out, 
were more help to farmers Vv'ith sales from $40,000 to 
$200,000, ''Directing income supports to middle-sized farms 
could be an effective policy for prolonging their 
survival,'' the report stated (King 1985, p.25[A]). 
In 19 8 5 many agricultural experts argued that the 
government should act to ease the hardships resulting from 
its changes in economic strategy. Since 1983 many 
Government economists had explained that the problems for 
farmers v/ere primarily concentrated among middle size farms 
with annual sales of over $40,000, The largest, those with 
sales over $500,000 were relatively untouched by the farm 
depression (Robbins 1985, p.26[A]), The full-time, primary 
farmers had been hurt the most by the way the farm lavv" and 
the budget deficit had v/orked to depress the farm economy 
(Kilborn 1985 , p.9[A]) . 
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The original 19 85 budget proposal called for $29 
billion in cuts in farm-support programs over three years. 
As a result of v/ide criticism that proposal was scaled down 
to $16 billion. Democrats and some Republicans contended 
that the Administration's proposals would shut down many 
medi u m - s i z e d  f a r m s  a l r e a d y  s q u e e z e d  b y  t h e  w o i s t  L a i m  c i i s i s  
since the Depression. Despite the expense involved, they 
said, farm-subsidy programs must be saved if tens of 
thousands of mid-sized farmers were to survive (Shenon 1985, 
p.11[A]). 
President Reagan vetoed legislation that v/ould have 
provided Federal loan guarantees and other financial help to 
farmers in the spring of 1985, According to Reagan, farmers 
''in need of immediate help are less than 4 percent, or 
around 4 percent at best, of all farmers in the United 
States.'' Agriculture Secretary .John Block, challenged at a 
Senate Agricultural Committee hearing, stated that the 
President ''misspoke.'' Agriculture Department figures 
indicated that one-third of all family-size commercial farms 
faced financial difficulty in 1985. This group included 
679,000 farms, and 229,000 of these farms faced problems 
ranging from difficulty in servicing debts to technical 
insolvency. According to the Mew York Times, this report 
was described as not being widely available, and Michael 
Masterson, a special assistant to Mr, Block, said it 'was his 
understanding that it had not been scheduled for release 
(Farnsv/orth 1985, p.l5[A]). 
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To better understand the implications of Reagan's 
actions, it is necessary to depict the predicament faced by 
U.S. farmers in 1985. Reagan's high deficit, high interest 
rate policies had so strengthened the dollar that American 
agriculture was in a trap. Those two factors had a 
tremendous impact on farming; high interest rates because 
farmers are heavy borrowers, and the strong dollar because 
American farm goods 'ft'ere thus more expensive to foreign 
purchasers (Kilborn 1984, p,l[A]). The high dollar of 1985 
brought Canadian hogs into Iowa, and filled Minnesota grain 
elevators with Argentine and Australian v/heat, Concurrently 
a longer-term problem loomed on the horizon, Third World 
n a t i o n s  l i k e  I n d i a ,  C h i n a  a n d  B r a z i l  w e r e  n o  l o n g e r  U . S .  
agricultural export markets; buoyed by high U.S. prices, 
they had become competitors (Phillips 1930, p.143). 
The Reagan Administration's proposals in 1986 formed a 
two part strategy. The first part called for the gradual 
elimination of the farm price support system in place since 
the Great Depression. The second part removed the 
Agriculture Department from the emergency loan business and 
replace it with already existing commercial banks (King 
1985, p.7[B]). 
John R. Block defended Reagan's plan to eliminate most 
farm price supports and subsidies. Responding to questions 
from reporters regarding the reduction of supports at a time 
when m_any farmers were perilously close to foreclosure. 
Block stated ''any farm program v^e write won't make a whit 
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of difference in how many farmers fail or succeed" (King 
1985, p,8[A]), 
By 1987 speculators and other absentee investors 
accounted for about 31 percent of farm transactions, up from 
23 percent in 1983, As landholdings concentrated, thousands 
of farmhouses were torn down, thousands of miles of fences 
ripped out (Phillips 1990, p.194). 
In autumn 1987 Don Paarlberg, a former senior official 
in the Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford agricultural departments, 
feared a social revolution as he saw outside capital 
flooding in to buy up agri cultural holdings, '' We are 
drifting toward a structure of agriculture which approaches 
what we twice (after the Revolution and in the Civil War) 
previously rejected-a wealthy, hereditary landowning class, 
with new entrants almost ruled out unless they are v^ell-to-
do {Ibid, p,194), 
In the Farm Belt the 1981-87 collapse in commodity and 
land prices v/as worse than in the 1920s. Huge amounts of 
wea1th vanished in the farm states. Estimates indicated 
that farmland values declined from $712 billion in 1980 to 
$392 billion in 1986 (Ibid, p,193). From 1972 to 1981, the 
value of farmland had increased from an average of $219 to 
$823 per acre. By early 1986, it had fallen to $596. 
Adjusted for inflation since 1972, it had fallen all the way 
back to $232 (Strange 1988, p.28), 
In 1988 farm prices v/ere beginning to recover. In 
1987-88, farmland values bounced back somev.'hat (Phillips 
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1990, p,144). However, by 1988 fev/er farmers could benefit 
from this recovery as many had left their farms, voluntarily 
or through foreclosure (Ibid, p,193). Betv^een 1980 and 1986 
several hundred thousand part-time and full-time U.S, 
farmers quit farming or went bankrupt (Miller 1988, p.256), 
Additionally, between 1982 and 1987 the nation lost more 
than 50,000 farms (Nelson 1992, p.475), 
The 1980s transformed agricultural structure more 
forcefully than any previous decade. The face of 
agriculture was changed from the Jeffersonian vision of 
farmer,'-'entrepreneurs to industrial agribusiness. This 
metamorphosis was, for the most part, predicted in A Time to 
ChQPgg. 
The Reagan Administration could not argue that their 
actions were the unintended consequences of a failure to 
understand the policy choices they made. Although the 
authors of the A Time to Choose failed to predict the high 
dollar and the high interest rates of the 1980s, the Reagan 
Administration v/ould still have to be held accountable for 
those developments as well, The Administration shared in 
the responsibility for the farm recession. Farm credit 
rates were higher because Vtashington had to borrovv* heavily 
to cover its ovm deficits (Mev»^ York Times 1985, p,26[A]), 
For example, farmers debts were $80 billion in 1973, In 
1980, that debt had risen to $155 billion. Just three years 
 ̂ J. 
after Reagan took office, in 1983, that debt had jumped to 
$214 billion (Kilborn 1984, p,22[A]). 
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In order to better understand the ramifications of 
Reagan's agricultural policy decision making, an examination 
of tv/o important policies v/ill be undertaken in Chapter 
Three. 
CHAPTER THREE 
AN OVERVIEW OF TWO CRITICAL POLICIES 
Introduction 
The Reagan years demonstrated that the authors of A 
Time to Choose had accurately predicted changes affecting 
agriculture. The report had identified the farm commodity 
programs and federal tax policy as t'vv'o of the most 
influential policies affecting the structure of agriculture: 
The (then) present tax policies are having 
significant effect on farm structure—on 
balance, they are biased toward the larger 
farmers and wealthy investors 
(U.S.D.A, 1981, p,i42), 
Our studies find that tax policy has 
significantly affected the structure, largely 
by reinforcing and supporting the consequences 
of other economic forces and policies 
(Ibid, p,149). 
The commodity programs have succeeded to some 
extent in supporting prices received by all 
farmers-both participants and nonparticipants, 
E.ut the evidence clearly suggests the programs 
have distributed income to the largest farmers, 
not necessarilv on the basis of need 
(Ibid. p.103),^ 
The authors also offered advice for future 
policymakers. Policies and programs should be carefully 
modified, with farm structure clearly in mind, so that they 
no longer encourage short-sighted exploitation of 
agricultural resources v/ith no thought for their use over 
the longer term. Future policymakers must recognize the 
costs to society of unnecessary concentration. Procedures 
should be modified to make financial and technical 
assistance available for those who would otherwise be 
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adversely affected by economic forces and policies (Ibid, 
p.143). The ''who'' referred to in the preceding sentences, 
turned out to be the primary farmers in the 1980s, 
Subsidy Policy 
There are two principal aims behind agricultural 
subsidies. One is to protect farmers against the inherent 
instability of the markets. Market prices tend to vary from 
year to year and even season to season. Even greater 
instability has been introduced since the early 1970s with 
the increasing proportions of U.S. commodities that are sold 
in foreign markets, v/here demand varies widely. The second 
purpose is to stabilize prices and supplies for consumers 
(Robbins 1983. p.l[A]), 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Reagan Administration 
repeatedly attempted to phase out subsidies, Unable to 
persuade Congress to go along it seems ironic that during 
the last year of Reag,an's tenure. agricultur.al subsidy 
policy staved off potential disaster. The 1988 drought 
provided one of the best examples of how a government-
financed farm program can pay big dividends for the 
consumer. The government spent 15 billion dollars to ensure 
a stable stockpile of commodities from 1986 to 1990. 
HoV'?ever, if taxpayers had not invested that money, it would 
have cost them—the consumers—an additional $40 billion at 
the grocery store just because of the inflation caused by 
the 1988 drought. Because the U.S. had ample supplies of 
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commodities, the effect on food prices was never felt by 
consumers (Cubbage 1994, p.10). 
There 'rfere tv/o basic devices for farm income support in 
the early 1980s. Price support loans guarantee farmers 
against disastrous price declines. For example, in 1982 
when corn was selling for about $2 a bushel, a participating 
farmer could take advantage of low interest government loans 
to help him wait for better prices. He could have borrovv'ed 
$2,55 a bushel. Aided by the loan, he could v/ait and sell 
his corn for $3.80 price which the market savv- in 1983. At 
this point the farmer would sell his corn and pay off the 
loan, If the price of corn had not gone higher than the 
$2,55 a bushel he borrowed, he could forfeit the corn and 
keep the money. 
The second device was a deficiency payment. If the 
average market prices fall belovv' a certain point, called a 
target price, the government steps in v/ith a payment. There 
is a maximum 15 cents a bushel ceiling under this program. 
In 1982, that price v/as $2.70, 15 cents higher than the loan 
rate of $2,55 per bushel. 
In order to participate in these programs, farmers have 
to cooperate in programs aimed at controlling production. 
In 1982 farmers had to idle 20 percent of their normal 
acreage. In addition they v/ere paid $1,50 per bushel for 
the yields they v/ould normally get from the set aside 
acreage (Robbins 1983, p,12[B]), 
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The expense of these programs was becoming one of the 
Reagan Administration's biggest problems, According to a 
Ne'tf York Times art icie, agricultural policy was the Reagan 
Administration's largest domestic failure, Federal spending 
for agricultural price supports soared sevenfold between 
1980 and 1983 . The total cost of farm programs exceeded $50 
billion in 1983, yet farm bankruptcies v/ere near record 
highs, farmland value was falling and farm income v^as 20 
percent below 1979 levels. The more the Government spent, 
the v/orse off farmers had become (Bovard 1986, p,23[A]). 
As a result, various approaches were explored in an 
attempt to reduce expenditures. One way to reduce 
agricultural subsidies is to limit the annual amount each 
farmer can receive. In 1971 Congress enacted a $10,000 
limit on payments per farm, Hov/ever, it was raised during 
subsequent legislative negotiation to $20,000, It v?as again 
later raised to $30,000 and by 1983 it was $50,000 I'Mew York 
Times 1983, p,3[C] '( , 
Despite the payment limitation, the biggest farms still 
received most of the payments the government made directly 
to farmers. For example, the largest 10 percent of the 
wheat farms got about 4 3 percent of the government payments 
in 1982 v/hile the smallest 10 percent received but 1.4 
percent. The top 10 percent of the cotton farms the same 
year got about 40 percent of the payments, the bottom 10 
percent, 1.2 percent. For corn the largest 10 percent got 
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over a third of the payments, v/hile the smallest 10 percent 
got only 1,2 percent (Strange 1988, p,129). 
According to a 1985 study by the Agriculture 
Department, just 24 percent of the direct aid v/ent to 
farmers who were badly stressed, but fully a third went to 
farmers v/ith annual revenues greater than $250,000 fMew York 
Times 1985, p,18[A]), Consequently, the Reagan 
Administration proposed a plan for reducing the limits on 
the subsidies an individual farm could receive. The limit 
would drop from $50,000 to $20,000 annually. In addition, a 
cap vas proposed on price support loans, A $200,000 cap v/as 
suggested, where previously there had been no limit (King 
1985, p,l[A]). But those limits were soon evaded when big 
farmers learned how to divide ownership of their acreage 
into smaller units, each of which qualified for the maximum 
amount. For example, in 1986 the Crown Prince of 
Liechtenstein, a Texas landov^ner, received more than $2 
million in federal subsidies (Miller 1988, p.258). 
The subsidy policies had another unintended effect. 
The aforementioned loan rates become the v/orld price and, in 
turn, foreign competitors know v/hat they can expect to get 
for crops which vie v;ith American crops. As a result, the 
element of risk is removed from planting decisions since the 
Americans had inadvertently set a minimum world price. In 
turn, this situation allows foreign competitors to undercut 
American farmers in bidding for v/orld markets (Kilborn 1984, 
p.22[A]). 
Thus the 1985 farm bill deviated from previou 
policy, A new program using an old strategy, the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 'rfas a long term, 
voluntary land retirement procjram, It allowed produt uO 
bid to enroll land in the CRP if they had; 1) an appropriate 
cropping history and 2) croplands considered highly erodible 
or environmentally sensitive. Most contract holders got 
annual payments for 10 years in exchange for converting and 
maintaining those lands in conserving uses (Clark, Johnson, 
and Amosson 1994, p,1415). 
The combination of a recovering economy and the 
reduction of output, as a result the CRP, helped put an end 
to the problems for Reagan. According to Kevin Phillips, in 
his book The Politics of the Rich and Poor, the farm 
subsidies of the Reagan Administration years vere anything 
but a ''from the beginning'' strategy. Farm income support 
outlays did mushroom during the 1980s (up from $11 billion 
in 19 81 to $25 billion in 1985 and a peak of $31 billion in 
1986 ), but that v/as because farmers had been devastated 
during the mid-1980s by tight money and by the international 
trade impact of the overpriced dollar, Stepped-up federal 
support payments were less a reward than a form of 
reparations (Phillips 1990, p.89). 
In 1983 one analyst noted that even though they are no 
more efficient, it is the large corporate producers v,'ho stay 
in business, v/hile family operations go bankrupt. This 
situation was the result of the commodity programs, the 
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Federal loan programs and the tax lav/s which favor the 
biggest producers. At the same time, the biggest producers 
v/ere usually conglomerates v/ith other sources of income 
(Brov/n 1983, p,30[A]), Once again, family farmers were 
devastated by Reagan's farm policy. This situation almost 
exactly duplicates what A Time to Choose had predicted, 
which was that a decision not to implement the changes 
recommended within the report would lead to an increase of 
corporate owned megafarms, 
In the case of commodity policy, analyst Marty Strange 
explains it best, The dilemma is this: when government sets 
commodity prices, it is not fixing a minimum standard of 
1iving for farm families. Instead, it is establishing a 
minimum return on investments in farmland. The benefits of 
such a progi^am fall squarely to those who own land and in 
direct proportion to the amount they ov/n (Strange 1988, p. 
199 ) , 
The effects of the 1985 farm bill, v/hich finally 
created a solution to the commodity problem, were not really 
felt until the very end of the of the Reagan years. It was 
a case of too little, too late for hundreds of thousands of 
primary farmers. 
Tax policy affected agriculture in much the same v/ay as 
commodity policy in the 1980s, A Time to Choose v/arned of 
the effects of unchanged agricultural tax policy for primary 
farrrsers ''Thos;© firms' with considerabl© wsalth or in high 
income tax brackets have the greatest ability to utilize the 
tax rules to their benefit, Research results are consistent 
on one point: the direction of change caused by tax policies 
has been towards increased concentration ot farms and 
wea11 h•• (U.S,D.A. 1981, p.91) . 
In the early 1980s the United States tax code sheltered 
high tax bracket individuals v^ho invested in farming 
enterprises. Yet, at the same time, many primary farmers 
v/ere in the zero tax bracket because they lacked the 
necessary income. Income from farming denied the I.R.S, by 
tax shelters was almost twice the amount generated. As this 
continued the econoinic conseguences were speeding up tne 
trends to deny ownership of farmland to those who were 
really farming it (Breimyer 1984, p,2[C]). 
Prior to 1986, tax breaks were distributed in 
proportion to the capital-intensity of the operation. 
Assuming that the corporation was in the 46 percent tax 
bracket, the established farmer in the 30 percent tax 
bracket, and the beginning farmer in the 20 percent bracket, 
the corporation would receive nearly tv/ice the tax subsidy 
per animal produced as the established farmer ($189 per sow 
versus $104), Likewise, the established farmer v/ould reap 
nearly twice the subsidy per sow as the beginning farmer 
($104 versus $56), Thus, the corporate farm got nearly 
three and a half times as much tax subsidy as the beginning 
farmer (Strancje 1988, p,158). 
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In 1984 the Economic Research Service of the Department 
of Agriculture reported that 50 percent of direct Government 
subsidies in 1983 went to the farms with the top 10 percent 
in gross annual sales (megafarms). The first recommendation 
within the report suggested changing tax policies that 
encouraged investment in farming solely to shelter nonfarm 
income, and to end special tax deductions that encouraged 
farm inefficiencies (Carpenter 1985, p.34[D]j. But it would 
not be until 19 86 before this advice was heeded. 
Once again, it was not until the end of the second 
Reagan term that policy changed to benefit primary farmers, 
The 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated the investment tax 
credit, It allov/ed the use of cash accounting by investors 
only if they were directly involved in the management of the 
farm, It also prohibited those investors not directly 
involved in the management of the farm from using farm 
losses to shelter other income from taxation, and it limited 
the use of prepaid expenses. Perhaps most importantly, it 
provided that capital gains be taxed as regular income 
(Strange 1988, p,163). 
Although the tax and subsidy changes recommended by A 
Time to Choose were finally implemented, the delay involved 
sped up the transition from family farming to industrial 
agribusiness. Chapter Four explores the 1990s to determine 
whether the trends established in the previous decade 
continued, and discusses significant policy changes that 
were implemented in 1995, 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE 199 5 FARM BILL 
Introduction 
The concern, depicted in A Time to Choose, vms that the 
ever increasing concentration of farm ownership would 
continue until only a few huge farms controlled nearly all 
agricultural production, The eighties unfolded much as the 
authors had predicted. However, the nineties might be an 
opportunity for change., this chapter explores this 
possibility, 
ThQ F.^rly Nineties 
Examining the average size of a farm at various points 
throughout this century demonstrates that agriculture is 
still in the process of moving tov^ards ever larger farms. 
Farms in the 1930s averaged about 150 acres (Kilborn 1984, 
p,l[A]), In the 1940s they had grov/n to an average of 195 
acres. Moving ahead to the 1970s, the average farm was 390 
acres (Berry 1977, p,34). By the mid 1980s farms averaged 
more than 400 acres (Kilborn 1984, p.l[A]), Between 1987 
and 1992, average farm size increased from 462 to 491 acres 
fThe Prairie Star 1995, p,37[C]), 
FolloVf'ing the trend established in the 1980s, by 1992 
there were 3 3 3,865 farms with sales of $100,000 or more. 
While they accounted for only 17 percent of all farms, these 
superfarms were responsible for 83 percent of total sales. 
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By 1994, farms with over $100,000 in sales still only 
represented 17% of all farms, yet they had increased their 
percentage of total sales to 87 percent of all sales 
(Rightmire 1994, p.l) In 1987 there were 32,023 farms with 
sales of $500,000 or more. By 1992. farms of this size had 
increased in number to 46,914 I'Thp, Prairie Star 1995, 
p,37[C]), Betv/een 1987 and 1992, average sales from all 
farms grew from $65,165 to $84,459, At the same time 
average expenses per farm increased from $51,797 to $67,928 
CIbid, p,37[C]). 
Thus, not surprisingly. there has been a decrease in 
small and medium-sized farms and an increase in large farms. 
Future projections indicate that in approximately 15 years 
there will be only 360,000 farms with sales of $100,000 or 
more and they v/ill account for almost all agricultural 
production. V>/hat little other production there is will be 
represented by a large number of very small farms which v,'ill 
be basically hobby farms (Margolis 1994, p.l[A]), 
An examination of early 1990s subsidy policies shows 
that government subsidies to farmers follow the same pattern 
which exemplified the 1980s. A 1995 report by the 
President's Counci1 on Economic Advi sors notes that '' two 
thirds of payments go to the largest 18 percent of farms-
even though the average income of these recipients is triple 
that of the average U.S. household" (The Amicus .Tournal 
19 9 5, p,5 0 ) , 
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These statistics demonstrate that the direction in 
agriculture continued to follov/ the pattern established in 
the 1980s, However. 1995 was a year that presented an 
opportunity for possible change. By Congressional 
tradition, a Farm Bill is generated at five year intervals, 
and 1995 was the year which forced Congress to examine 
agricultural policy. The question was v/ould the result be a 
continuation of past policy, or perhaps a change in a new 
direction? 
The 1995 Farm Bill 
The 1995 farm bill v/as made into law in April of 1996. 
Billed as ''Freedom to Farm,the Federal Agricultural 
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act v^as passed and signed by 
President Clinton. This lav/ made tremendous changes in 
agricultural policy. The old system of transfer payments 
was to be abandoned. Under the FAIR Act, transfer payments 
through the year 2002 are scheduled and do not depend on 
market prices or prespecfled target prices. The stated 
intent is to move to a more market oriented agriculture and 
phase out government transfer payments (Baquet 1996, p,22). 
In conjunction with FAIR another law was instituted. 
Entitled the Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP). 
this act lumped together the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRPj with earlier conservation legislation. EQIP had an 
additional far-reaching effect on family farms that will be 
discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
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However, in terms of subsidy policy, the goal of EQIP 
is to reduce government involvement in overall production. 
Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman was quoted as saying, 
'•gone v/ill be the days of using the CRP as a method of 
controlling how much of a particular crop is grown'' 
(Brasher 199 6, p.l). 
Consequently, the combination of FAIR and EQIP have 
drastically altered the outlook for U.S. agriculture. These 
acts are viev/ed as a radical departure from the price 
supports and land set-aside provisions of the farm bills of 
the last 60 years. Some experts say the farm bill is aimed 
at commercial agriculture, and it ignores small farms and 
rural life. A more liberal farm organization, the Farmers 
Union, is concerned that farmers are losing their safety net 
(Stevens 1996, p.3). 
Hov/ever, regardless of the standpoint from which this 
farm bill is viev/ed, it is clear that the federal government 
v/ill no longer attempt to intervene on behalf of the family 
farm or any other farm for that matter, since the 
governmental role will be almost nonexistant after 2002. It 
seems safe to conclude that the further consolidation of 
agriculture will continue and that farm sizes will continue 
to grow and farm numbers will continue to decline. 
The consequences of the 1995 farm bill do not give much 
hope to family farmers. The fact that the government is in 
the process of reducing it's role in agricultural policy 
could certainly be viewed as the culmination of 80s policy, 
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In fact, Reagan Vv'as unable to achieve his goal of making 
agriculture a ''market oriented'' industry, which is exactly 
what FAIR accomplished. 
The 1995 farm bill altered another facet of 
agricultural policy v^hich dates back to the 1930s, The issue 
at stake was the renewal of the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP). As mentioned earlier, the CRP was created during the 
mid 1980s, This program was, up until 1995, the most recent 
government policy concerning soil erosion. The conclusion 
of this chapter examines this in greater detail. 
The CRP and Soil Erosion 
At first glance the link between soils and farming 
might not be obvious, but the topic should not be 
underestimated. The greatest dilemma facing agricultural 
production (whether by family farmers or agribusiness), both 
historically and currently, is soil erosion. To understand 
the ramifications of soil erosion, one only has to look at 
the 1930s, During that period, commonly referred to as the 
Dust Bowl, the United States was involved in one of the 
three greatest, manmade, ecological disasters in the history 
of the world (Worster 1979, p.4). Since the introduction of 
mechanized agriculture, which occurred just before the Dust 
Bovs'l, soil surveys by the Soil Conservation Service 
indicated that about one-third of the original topsoil on 
U.S, croplands, in use as of the mid-1980s, had already been 
washed or blown into ri%''ers, lakes, and oceans, Some of the 
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country's richest agricultural lands, such as those in Iowa, 
have lost about half their topsoil (Miller 1988, p,198). 
Most importantly, soil erosion is greatly increased as a 
direct result of agribusiness farming methods. Using these 
methods projected soil erosion, over the next 5 0 years, may 
destroy productivity on U.S. cropland acreage equal to the 
combined areas of the states of Nev/ York, Mew .Jersey, Maine, 
Mew Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut (Ibid. p,198). 
One of the reasons that soil erosion has not been a 
high priority government policy is that it usually occurs at 
such a slow rate that its cumulative effects take decades to 
become apparent. For example, the removal of 1 millimeter 
(1./254 inch) of soil, an amount easily lost during a rain or 
wind storm, is so small that it goes undetected; but the 
accumulated soil loss at this rate over a 25-year period 
would amount to 25 mm (1 inch)—an amount that would take 
about 500 years to replace by natural processes. If the 
average rate of topsoil erosion exceeds the rate of topsoil 
formation, the topsoil on that land becomes a nonrenewable 
resource that is being depleted (Ibid, p.205), 
During the late 1970s, soil erosion rates v/ere 
considered to be very high. According to a 1382 federal 
survey, 4 4 percent of the crop land in the United States v/as 
losing topsoil at ''excessive rates,'' with 1,7 billion tons 
permanently lost each year. Studies in the United States 
Corn Belt shov/ that for each inch of topsoil lost, average 
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yields are reduced by 6 percent I'Mev.' York Times 1984, 
P.20[A]), 
Since 19 7 5, nearly 70 million acres of new farmland had 
been brought into production, A large percentage of this 
new farmland was highly erodabl© land, much of it former 
grasslands and wetlands (Schneider 1985, p.l6[A]). 
In 1984 government policy reversed direction, from the 
policies of the 1970s v/hen farmers Vv'ere encouraged to plant 
''fence post to fence post, '' and 82 million acres v/ere 
idled. However, these kinds of inconsistent government 
policies can contribute mightily to soil erosion as a New 
York Times article explained, ''In the 1970s, urged to grow 
all they could, farmers planted crops on lands that never 
should have been plowed. Vs^hen paid to desist, the hard-
pressed farmers lacked the money or time to reseed the idle 
land'' ['New York Times 1984, p,16[A]), 
Thus, a response to the dual problems of soil erosion 
and the reintroduction of farming of former grassl.ands was 
addressed in the 1985 farm bill, It contained stipulations 
making farmers who destroyed fragile land ineligible for 
Government benefits. Additionally, provisions were made to 
take 40 million acres, 10 percent of U.S. farmland, out of 
production to become part of a nev/ national land inventory. 
Only grass or tress could be grown on this land (Schneider 
1985, p,16[A]), 
The program created by the 1985 farm bill came to be 
known as the GRP. The CRP developed as part of tv/o farm 
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bills. Congress enacted the program in Title XII of the 
Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA) and amended it in the Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (FACTA), In 
order to put cropland into the CRP, farmers v/ere required to 
sign ten-year contracts with the government. Congress' 
original objective for the CRP was to reduce cropland 
erosion. Secondary objectives were to: 1) protect the 
nation's long-term capacity to produce food and fiber, 
2) reduce sedimentation, 3) improve water quality, 4) create 
fish and v/ildlife habitat. 5) curb production of surplus 
commodities, and 6) provide farm income suppor t f Furrow 
1995, p.30). 
In addition, the CRP recognized that conservation 
required attention not only of public lands, but on private 
lands as v/ell. Since three quarters of all land in the 
lower 48 states is private land the inclusion of farmers, 
the principal landov/ners, v/as obvious. 
By 1995, a decade after its inception, some conclusions 
concerning the overall effectiveness of the CRP had become 
apparent. One of the consequences had been that soil 
erosion had been reduced on cropland by one-third (Johnson 
1995, p.22). On average, the rate of soil erosion on land 
that 'rfent into CRP v/as reduced from more than 20 tons per 
acre annually to less than tv^o tons (Cubbage 1994, p,40). 
Eventually, 36,500,000 total acres were enrolled in the 
Conservation Reserve Program f Farm .Journal 1995, p. 36) The 
U.S.D.A.'s Economic Research Service (ERS) estimates soil 
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erosion reduction on the 36,5 million acres enrolled in CRP 
at ?00 million tons annually. In turn, this cut in soil 
erosion spawned major improvements in water and air quality, 
ERS figures sediment flov/ into waterways had been cut by 100 
million tons a year (Mooney 1994 , p.28), 
Another facet of the CRP has been a rebirth of native 
habitats for v/ildlife (Ibid, p.28), A North Dakota study 
found that over 70 species of wild birds make their home on 
CRP land (Cubbage 1994, p,40 5, V'^ildlife biologists say 
things v/ill only get better as CRP wetlands restorations and 
2 million-plus acres of tree planting come into full bloom. 
In fact, the ERS estimated in 1990 that society stand to 
glean as much as $13 billion v/orth of environmental benefits 
from the life of the CRP program (Mooney 1994, p,28). 
But the first of the program's 10-year contracts 
expired Oct, 1,1995, The contracts that ended in 1995 
covered just over 2 million acres enrolled in the CRP, 
Furthermore, contractual commitments that ended in 1996 
covered more that 13 million acres or about 36 percent of 
all CRP land fFurrow 1995, p,30), In addition, nearly tvv'o-
thirds of the 36,5 million acres in CRP will come out of the 
program in 1997 and 1998 (Cubbage 1994, p,40). 
The 1995 farm bill forced Congress to decide if it v/as 
going to continue appropriating money to extend the 
contracts or, perhaps, purchase easements to maintain the 
retired lands in conservation use f Furrov/ 1995, p,30). But 
even if Congress had decided to offer to extend some or all 
of these contracts, producers would have to decide about 
their CRP land's future use (Ibid, p. 30), Hov/ever, several 
studies indicate that farmers intend to put 40 percent or 
more of CRP land back into production. That means that 14,6 
million acres of erosive land was targeted to once again 
begin producing crops (Horstmeier 1994, p.12). 
At the same time, as of 1995, not including the land 
taken out of production by the CRP, soil erosion still 
impaired one out of four acres (The Amicus Journal 1995, 
p,50), Allov/ing the environmentally sensitive land, 
enrolled in the CRP, to re-enter production would further 
worsen soil erosion and water quality problems. 
Additionally, a great number o£ wildlife habitat acres would 
be lost (Cubbage 1994, p.40). 
Therefore, many argued that the effects of potentially 
ending the CRP would have profound ramifications for the 
future of the U.S. soil inventory. Additionally, some 
experts contended that discontinuing the CRP v/ould likely 
cost the government more than if it had been continued. If 
CRP land re-entered production, it could mean bigger grain 
surpluses and lower commodity prices which in turn 
translates into larger government commodity price deficiency 
payments to farmers (Ibid, p.40), 
With the passage of EQIP, the CRP was abandoned, The 
nev/ conservation program uses five and ten year contracts 
v/hich pay for up to 7 5 percent of the cost of conservation 
pract i ces. Additionally, total cost-share payments to any 
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person are limited to $10,000 annual and $50,000 for the 
life of the contract fRanchland Revievv' 1996, p,7). 
Moreover, it is estimated that more than 40 percent of CRP 
land is not vulnerable enough to qualify under the new rules 
(Ibid. p,l). According to another estimate this will amount 
to at least 14 million acres of land re-entering production 
as CRP contracts expire (Stevens 1996, p.3), Additionally, 
another facet of EQIP allows producers who have CRP 
contracts v/hich are five years old or older the option to 
request an early release (Johnson, Zidack, and Stauber 1996, 
p , 21) , 
The result is that the government policy concerning 
soil erosion, once again, reversed course. Rather than 
keeping the highly erodable lands protected by CRP contracts 
out of production, the 1995 farm bill allows for much of 
these lands to, again, be brought under cultivation, Thus 
the soil erosion policy of the 1980s will be significantly 
diminished. As a result, soil erosion rates are likely to 
become the problem they were in the 1970s, However, there 
is one key difference, as a result of the aforementioned 
expansion in farm sizes, and the increase in soil erosion 
associated with agribusiness farming techniques, the 
possibility of greatly increased soil erosion exists. 
Unfortunately, soil is a non-renewable resource, and the 
latest government policy does not appear to address the 
issue. 
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Now that the future of agriculture appears fairly 
clear, at least in terms of government policy, an obvious 
question would be v/hat are the effects of this transition 
from family farming to industrial agribusiness. Chapter 
Five begins by describing the situation facing agriculture 
at the present time, 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CULTURAL AMD SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
Thg Current Situation 
One of the problems identified in A Time to Choose was 
the aging of the average U.S. farmer. An analysis of the 
intervening time period reveals a number of findings. Dr, 
Robert Soileau, extension rural sociologist Vv'ith Louisiana 
State University, notes that a recurring concern in 
agricultural circles is the advancing age of U.S. farmers. 
The census of agriculture has shown a rise in their average 
age for several decades, from 48.0 years in 1940 to 52,0 in 
1987. The most damaging change, however, appears to be the 
percentage of farmers younger than 35. For example, those 
under 2 5 rose from 5 7,00 0 in 197 0 to 101,000 by 1984. By 
1990, their number had fallen to 52,000, largely due to the 
agricultural crisis of the 80's. As a percentage of all 
farmers, those under 3 5 dropped from 20.3 percent to 13.3 
percent in that same time span fLandhandler 1994 p.2). 
A coexisting situation has appeared, It is very 
possible that 75 percent of all farm assets will change 
hands in the next 20 years. The reason is that thirty-four 
percent of all agricultural assets are held by individuals 
over the age of 65 (Kohl, 1993 p.6). 
Furthermore, to gain entry into agriculture, economic 
farming units typically will require $2 million or more of 
assets. Because the family farm must be refinanced each 
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generation, it is burdened in generating net worth to form 
an economic unit. Strategies such as aid from parents and 
off-farm work help, but difficulties will intensify 
especially Vv'hen competing with corporations not facing life 
cycle problems (Tweeten 1994, p,24[C]), 
At the same time, as of the mid 1390's, off-farm income 
is deemed critical for those with sales under $200,000 
annually, the cutoff point for primary farms. This large 
income is recommended to enable these producers to maintain 
their standard of living (Kohl, 1993 p.6). When A Time to 
Chose was written, rural residences were described as the 
operations that required off farm income. This category of 
farms generated less than $40,000 a year. 
However, as these statistics demonstrate, young farmers 
are the least likely to be able to purchase farms. This 
situation, coupled with the understanding that the basic 
premise of family farming is that one has the opportunity to 
obtain land and pay for it through farming, makes for a 
dubious future , In addition, as of 1993, forty-seven 
percent of all young farmers' assets were rented, leased, or 
jointly owned (Ibid, p.6), In other words, these people, 
who if they belonged to their parents generation, would have 
bought farms, instead, as of the mid 1990s are dependent on 
other methods to gain entry into agriculture. 
Throughout this discussion one question begs to be 
ansv/ered. Why is it necessary to have young farmers? One 
expert, Wendell Berry, responds in a New York Times article. 
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The first issue was whether or not farming can be understood 
as an industry. Berry argued that it cannot for two primary 
reasons: First, farming depends upon living creatures and 
biological processes, whereas the materials of industry are 
not alive, except of course, the workers, and the processes 
are mechanical; and, second, a factory is, and is expected 
to be, temporary, v/hereas a farm, if well farmed, will last 
forever, and if poorly farmed destroyed forever. 
In turn, a second question is whether or not the most 
productive agriculture in necessarily the best. Berry 
argued that it is not, for good agriculture requires soil 
conservation and other forms of maintenance as v/ell as 
productivity, U.S. soil erosion rates, v/hich are expected 
to increase as a result of EQIP, suggest that agricultural 
yields are coming at an enormous cost, v/hich sooner or later 
must be paid (Berry 1985, p.27[A]). 
As Berry explains, it is based on factors more cultural 
than technocratic. The basic methods have been available 
for hundreds of years, but they can be used only by farmers 
who know hovv to use them and who have the desire to use 
them. The only known way to get these farmers in 
substantial numbers is to rear them on farms, in farming 
families that are not too strapped for time or money to farm 
well. In America, because of the belief in private 
ov/nership of property, this means that farmland must be 
divided and ov/ned in small parcels and that farms, farmers, 
and farm communities must thrive (Ibid, p.27[A]), By way of 
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comparison, during the Great Depression, over one-fourth of 
the American people v/ere farmers and many more had grown up 
on farms or knew parents who had been farmers (Strange 1988, 
p,15) , 
Thus, the current situation facing potential family 
farmers cannot be viewed as very promising. However there 
have been times v/hen policymakers addressed the implications 
of the reduced role of the family farm. The following is 
provided as an example of such a time. 
Historical Analysis 
Nineteenth century American history offers examples 
demonstrating the effects of large farms and the problems 
they created. According to Don Piasani, in his book From 
the Family Farm to Agribusiness, the most distressing aspect 
of large scale farming in the 1870s, vms the way in which it 
stifled the family farm. Small farms were anathema to the 
land baron. Most large farmers opposed small farming, In 
turn, critics of large scale farming charged that the large 
farms retarded the development of rural communities and 
degraded the status of labor. The vast farms were all but 
deserted except in the late fall and spring. Since field 
hands were needed only during planting and harvesting, they 
became a transient work force. Agricultural wealth depended 
on a permanent class of dispossessed v/ho worked for 
''starvation v,'ages'' (Pisani 1984, p.ll). 
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The greatest danger posed by large scale farming was 
its tendency to perpetuate, if not create, land monopoly, A 
special committee of the California Legislature, one of 
several formed in the 187 0s to study land problems in the 
state, argued that these types of land monopolies created a 
vast class of renters similar to conditions at that time of 
land tenure in Europe (Ibid, p.14). 
In the nineteenth century, many Californians viewed the 
future v/ith alarm. In 1871, Henry George v/arned that 
California might suffer the same fate as Rome: 
In the land policy of Rome may be traced 
the secret of her rise, the cause of her 
fall. The (Roman) Senate granted away 
the public domain in large tracts, just 
as our Senate is doing now: and the 
fusion of the little farms into large 
estates by purchase, by force, and by 
fraud v/ent on, until v/hole provinces 
were ov/ned by tv/o or three proprietors, 
and chained slaves had taken the place 
of the sturdy peasantry of Italy. The 
small farmers who had given her strength 
to Rome v/ere driven to the cities, to 
swell the ranks of the proletarians, 
and become clients of the great families, 
or abroad to perish in the wars. There 
came to be but two classes the enormously 
rich and their dependents as slaves; society 
thus constituted bred its destroying 
monsters; the old virtues vanished, 
population declined, art sank, the old 
conquering race actually died out, and 
Rome perished Centuries ago this 
happened, but the laws of the universe 
are to-day what they v/ere then (Ibid, p. 12). 
The vision these leaders had in California, foreseeing 
the effects of large scale farmincj, demonstrates that there 
has been a historical concern for the future of small-scale 
family farms. Moving into the 20th century, a number of 
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studies have examined another consequence associated v/ith 
industrial agribusiness. In this case, the effects of 
poverty associated with large scale farming will be 
analyzed. 
In the late 1930s, a government study was conducted 
corrtparing the consequences of family farming versus 
industrialized agriculture in terms of rural impact. The 
central hypothesis was that the key factors influencing 
community development was the percentage of hired v/orkers in 
the farm-occupation mix: the higher the proportion, the 
lower the quality of life in the community. The findings 
supported the hypothesis. In 1977, the Small Farm Viability 
Project provided a follow-up study. Again, the evidence 
supported the earlier findings (U.S.D.A. 1981, p.38). 
A 1986 University of California-Davis study found that 
as farm size increases, so does poverty (U.S. Congress 1986, 
p,27). ''In rural communities dominated by very large 
(agribusiness] firms, the settlement and housing patterns 
reflect the increasingly transient nature of the labor 
force. The symbol of the large corporate farm becomes the 
trailer house'' (Berry 1977, p.172), 
Moving ahead into the 1990s, the average employee at 
the National Farms hog operation, a typical corporate hog 
farm, earns $15,000 per year. Considering that the salaries 
of managers are above those of the average worker, it's easy 
to conclude that vrorking for a corporate-owned hog facility 
is a poor substitute for an entrepreneurial farming 
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operation. Yet, such jobs may be the only alternatives 
available for hog producers unable to compete v/ith the 
factory farms' cheap pork chops (Carter 1994, p.3), 
It seems fair to conclude that the situation facing 
aspiring farmers, currently, does not look very promising, 
Hov^ever, the combination of that predicament, in conjunction 
with the diminished role of the family farm, has other 
consequences as well. The following section investigates 
some of these developments. 
Implications of Concentration 
Another disturbing trend has come to light in the 
1990s. The following example indicates that further 
concentration in agriculture, predicted in A Time to Choose, 
is fast becoming a reality, Nebraska-based IBP and ConAgra 
and Minneapolis-based Cargill control about 80 percent of 
all beef packaged in the United States, In 1994 cattle 
auction prices v/ere 95 cents; in 1995 prices plunged to 64 
cents. Agricultural economists state that this is the worst 
downturn in 25 years (McGrory 1996, p,7[A]), At the same 
time, several signs point to anything but disaster in the 
cattle industry. The cattle supply was up only 3 percent 
over 1993; consumer meat prices have failed to drop v/ith the 
cattle prices; and years of declining meat consumption seems 
to have leveled off and show signs of rebounding. As a 
result, the U.S.D.A. has started a study of market 
conditions and the U.S. Senate has approved a bill calling 
55 
for an executive branch task force to analyze the situation 
(Ibid. p.7[A]), 
Although other facets of agricultural production have 
not been affected as dramatically as the beef industry, 
there is growing evidence that other commodities may soon be 
similarly affected. In order to demonstrate this 
contention, an profile of the industrialization of 
agriculture v^ill be undertaken. 
The term for this process, the movement of food 
processors and input suppliers into food production, is 
vertical integration, It is best described as ownership 
control of more than one stage moving up and do'rfn the chain 
between production and consumption. Agricultural 
commodities that are produced as a result of the vertical 
integration process have a number of characteristics that 
distinguish them from commodities traded in the traditional 
markets found at the farm lev^el , Meanv/hile, commodities 
that depend primarily on traditional markets tend to be 
those produced by typical, independent family-farm 
operations (U.S.D.A, 1981, p.62). 
The vertically integrated livestock industry sprouted 
in the 1950s v^hen Don Tyson and a handful of others 
perfected the contract poultry system. Under a typical 
contracting system, Tyson would provide the chicks, feed, 
medication, and instructions on hov; to raise the chickens. 
The farmer was asked to provide the land, ''grov^er house'' 
and the labor. At the end of each growing cycle, the 
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company v/ould pay the grov/ers a set fee for each chick 
produced (Carter, 1994 p,14), 
As the contract system took root, fully one third of 
the nation's poultry farms disappeared betvv'een 1954 and 
1964. Profits for the contracting companies soared, and 
according to Successful Farming magazine's periodic survey 
of the largest farms in the country, four out of the five 
largest farms specialized in poultry production (Ibid, p.3), 
In poultry markets the discovery of significant economies of 
scale in both selling and processing, as a result of 
technological developments, led to high concentration at the 
first-handler level, This in turn created incentives for 
backward integration into production by processors of 
broilers and turkeys, and forvv'ard integration into 
processing and production by feed suppliers, to insure full-
capacity operation. A handful of contractors control most 
of the poultry production and small or moderate sized 
growers have no access to the market (U.S.D.A, 1981. p.61). 
Vertical integration streamlined the poultry industry. 
Some producers have found a niche within this enterprise as 
contractors. The contracting producer provides the poultry 
for giant corporations such as Tyson Foods. Hov/ever, these 
contracts require large capital investments in very 
specialized buildings. Because of the nature of the 
contracts many argue that there really are not many choices 
for producers because of the large investment in the 
buildings (Johnson 1994, p,15). As Professor Neil Hamilton 
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of Drake University explains, ''Contract production makes 
farmers employees of their own land, with limited control 
over the production or marketing of crops, and little 
opportunity to profit from risincf markets'' (Carter 1994, 
p . 3 ) . 
At this point one issue needs to be addressed, It 
v/ould appear that ''bigger is better,'' meaning that these 
larger farms will necessarily have lower per unit production 
costs. However, studies conducted by the Department of 
Agriculture shov/ that the peak of farming efficiency was 
reached on farms that could be tended by one family with 
good equipment and only occasional help from hired labor 
(Robbins 1985, p.27[A]). 
Additionally, one of the reasons that these large farms 
appear more efficient is attributable to two factors. 
First, because there are so fev^, there is little competition 
among them. l^/ith less competition, they are relatively 
immune from the discipline of the free market. Beyond this 
market concentration, these companies have another potential 
advantage. Their sheer size and financial might permits 
input suppliers and processors to compete with farms in the 
actual production of food, even if they are less efficient 
than farmers. The reason is simple. They have the 
advantage of providing their own inputs and securing their 
ov/n markets under favorable terms. In fact, because they 
are engaged in more than one stage of production and 
processing of a product firms with market power at one of 
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those stages can dominate competition in another stage 
(Strange 1988, p.281), 
Corporate hog facilities have begun to operate in the 
same fashion except that they do not contract for the hogs, 
they produce their ov/n, Since 1980, as a result of vertical 
integration, 65 percent of independent hog producers have 
gone out of business (Smith 1995, p.18). 
The reason processors and suppliers are rapidly moving 
into food production is profit. This profit is especially 
attractive v/hen integration limits the risk of loss, as in 
contract production, In poultry and swine contract 
production, corporations shift more than half of the 
investment in the system-the cost of the facilities-onto 
producers. Contracts typically place the mortality and 
environmental risks on producers. Short-term contracts 
allow companies to decrea.,se or end production when profits 
drop, v/hile the producer remain responsible for paying the 
cost of the facility (Hamilton 1994, p.29). 
The beef industry is undergoing a similar transition, 
The top five beef packers slaughtered nearly 90 percent of 
all fed cattle in 1994. That's nearly 4 percent more than 
1993, and 13 percent more than in 1988. These top five 
include IBP inc., Conagra, Excel, National Beef Packing Co., 
and BeefAmerica Operating Co (Kay 19 94, p.9), An 
examination of the top packer, IBP Inc., indicates that it 
is the most highly focused in the business. In May of 1994 
it completed its acquisition of a cooked-meats business. It 
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already ov/ns a variety of further-processed ventures. It is 
moving rapidly toward producing nearly all close-trim fresh 
beef, In addition, it has plans to expand its hides 
business (Ibid p,9). 
It is not only the livestock industry that is 
expanding. Every other aspect of the farming business is 
also grov/ing, and some observers have suggested that these 
concentrations, too, pose potential problems. Dan Morgan, 
in his book Merchants of Grain, demonstrates that five major 
companies control the U, S, grain trade. An example 
demonstrating the power of one of these companies dates back 
to 1973, An Interstate Commerce Commission investigation of 
Continental Grain questioned why some small grain elevators 
were unable to obtain grain boxcars. The ICC found that 
when Continental Grain shipped grain by railroad cars ''the 
costs were passed back to farmers and small elevator 
managers, v/ho paid for a transportation shortage that was 
not of their making'' (Morgan 1980, p.418), 
Despite the many problems associated with the rapid 
transformation of the agricultural enterprise, most 
indications are that the changes will continue. Upon 
further investigation, more problems have been identified as 
a consequence of the further concentration v/ithin 
agriculture. 
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Ecological ImplicatiQns 
Another ramification of the transition from family 
farms to industrial agribusiness involves the ecological 
costs as'sociated Vv'ith this transformation. One observer 
noted the inevitability of this problem; ''The great irony 
is that the technologies that are the most environmentally 
destructive are also those that best accommodate industrial 
farming systems'' (Strange 1988, p.8). Industrialized 
agriculture can feed large numbers of people using 
relatively little human labor to produce high yields on a 
relatively small percentage of cropland, However, this form 
of agriculture has a greater overall environmental impact on 
the air. soil, and water than any other system in modern 
industrialized societies (Miller 1988, p.247). 
Industrial agriculture is based on deliberately keeping 
ecosystems in early stages of succession, where net primary 
productivity of one or a few plant species (such as corn or 
v/heat) is high. But such simplified ecosystems are highly 
vulnerable. A major problem is the continual invasion of 
crop fields by unwanted pioneer species.... Weeds, pests, 
or disease can wipe out an entire crop unless it is 
artificially protected with pesticides, herbicides, and 
insecticides (Ibid, p.127), Consequently, insecticide use 
in the United States increased tenfold betv^een 1940 and 1980 
(Ibid, p,522), 
These large farms also tend to produce more v/ater 
pollution, since large scale monoculture farming uses more 
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petrochemicals, According to the Nebraska Department of 
Health, eighty-one municipal wells in Nebraska—about one in 
five—are near or above tolerable levels of contamination 
from nitrate-nitrogen, The principal sources of nitrate 
pollution in groundwater in that state are agricultural 
chemicals and livestock wastes (Strange 1988, p.41). In 
lov/a, ''environmental officials reckon that up to half of 
that state's municipal water supplies are contaminated Vv-ith 
pesticides or other synthetic organic chemicals'' (Bullard, 
1986 p.ll). One facet of this problem results from the 
concentration of animals in livestock feedlots: ''manure has 
become a waste-disposal problem and a pollutant instead of 
the fertilizer resource it was when animals were scattered 
widely on thousands of farm' " (Strange 1988,, p. 205 ), For 
example, the hogs produced inside the National Farms' 
confinement buildings generate yearly the amount of waste 
that would be produced by a city of 250,000 people. 
National Farms' system of disposing of the liquid waste by 
sprinkling it on the fertile topsoil adjoining the Pawnee 
National Grasslands prompted a warning from County health 
officials three years ago. Health officials at that time 
detected a steadily increasing nitrite level 48 inches below 
the surface (Carter 1994, p.3). 
In conjunction with this, the effects of industrial 
agriculture upon drinking water is compounded because it is 
estimated that only 1% of pesticides applied to crops 
reaches the target pests, The remaining 99% ends up in the 
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air, v/ater, and other nontarget organisms, including people. 
In 1986 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported 
that traces of 17 different pesticides were found in 
groundv/ater supplies in 23 states, Water from almost 1,500 
wells in California's Central Valley cannot be used for 
drinking, bathing, or cooking because of pesticide 
contamination (Miller 1988, p,523). The problem has become 
even greater in the 90s. The Environmental Protection 
Agency cites agriculture as the number one pollutant in a 
1992 National Water Quality Inventory. At issue is 
agriculture's contribution to nonpoint-source pollution, the 
generic name for rain-driven runoff (Klintberg 1994, p,10), 
Additionally it was found that agricultural runoff is the 
source of 72 percent of the contaminates in polluted rivers 
I'The Ami nis .Tnurnal . 1995 p,50). 
A study released by the Environmental Vtorking Group 
stated that 14.1 million people routinely drink water 
contaminated v/ith five major agricultural pesticides— 
atrazine, cyanazine, simazine, alachlor and metolachlor, 
The information for the study, which focused on the 
midwestern states using these pesticides on their corn and 
soybeans, was collected from 20,000 water tests conducted by 
the U.S, Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (Cohn, 1994 p.6[A]). 
Another problem surfaces v/ithin the context of a 
discussion of the petrochemicals so essential to 
industrialized agriculture. Considering that the most vital 
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inputs for industrialized agriculture are oil and gas, it is 
hard to exaggerate the extent of the continuing dependence 
on these fuels to power machinery, to create and distribute 
herbicides, insecticides, and pesticides, In addition, oil 
is a primary ingredient of fertilizers used on soils 
stressed by repeated planting of the same crops. It is also 
used to dry those crops after harvest, as well as heating 
animal factories (Strange 1988, p,221). Of concern is 
possible future shortages of key inputs, such as fossil 
fuels and phosphate. Years of low v/orld oil prices have 
invited complacency and low investment in new energy 
capacity. In turn, that makes agriculture vulnerable to an 
oil shock similar to the mid-seventies (Tweeten 1994, 
p,24[C]). Moreover there have been many studies estimating 
the amounts of world oil reserves and, v/hile, the estimates 
vary widely, they agree that oil is a finite resource. 
Obviously, then, one of the consequences of the transition 
from family farming to industrial agribusiness has been to 
put all of the eggs in one basket, so to speak, a basket 
based on a finite resource. 
Another finite resource that affects agricultural 
production is land. Obviously, land is the most important 
component in farming. Industrialized farming affects the 
U.S. land inventory in a number of Vv^ays. For example, soil 
compaction, v/hich results from the use of the heavy 
equipment utilized by industrial agribusiness, reduces the 
capacity of soil to absorb water, reducing yield and 
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increasing erosion due to runoff of rainfall (Strange 1988, 
p,204). Concurrently, the U.S. is also losing the 
equivalent of about 3 mi 11 ion acres a year due to soil 
degradation, and salt buildup in irrigated soil, In 
conjunction this, the United States has been losing annually 
about 3 million more acres of rural land, one-third of its 
prime agricultural land, due to the spread of housing 
developments, highways, and shopping malls (Miller 1988, 
p,21) , 
Clearly, the implications of the continued expansion of 
agribusiness carries with it many effects, Thus, with a 
better understanding of these consequences, an obvious 
question would be, what does the future hold? Chapter Six 
investigates a number of different possibilities. 
CHAPTER SIX 
OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Siistainahle Farminn 
As a reaction to agricultural production shifting from 
family farming to industrial agribusiness, in the United 
States, some experts have looked to other countries' 
agricultural practices for direction, Many of the V'jorlds' 
countries have implemented very different agricultural 
policies. For example. Japan has found v/ays to feed its 
population without relying on agribusiness, Vernon Ruttan 
demonstrates the differences between United States and 
Japanese methods of farming in his book Agricultural 
Re search P o1icy. The Japanese have managed to feed their 
population, despite a very small amount of agricultural 
land, through techniques completely different than those 
employed by American agribusiness. Instead the Japanese 
have rejected large industrial agribusiness methods because 
they are viewed as inefficient. 
A more specific example, in the dairy industry, can be 
found in New Zealand. One efficiency measure is pounds of 
milk solids produced per acre or per farmer. New Zealand 
cows give half as much milk as American cows, but one Nev/ 
Zealand farmer produces twice the number of pounds per man. 
A typical Nev/ Zealand dairy consists of a husband-wife team 
•that milks 160 cows on 160 acres. Meanwhile, the American 
focus on pounds of milk per cow is achieved by purchasing 
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high-pov/ered feed ingredients. In the end, there are fev/er 
cows, fewer farmers, and more money spent on inputs from off 
the farm (Lehnert 1994, p.52). 
Using techniques from the aforementioned examples, some 
American researchers have been focusing their efforts on 
different types of agricultural production in the United 
States. Perhaps the most promising possibility is called 
sustainable farming. The goal of sustainable agriculture is 
to produce food in ways that can be continued indefinitely. 
It usually involves substituting renev/able resources 
generated on the farm for purchased nonrenewable resources. 
It focuses on reducincj pesticides, chemical fertilizer, and 
energy use. It also makes use of ecological practices such 
as crop rotation, landscape management, and livestock waste 
management (The Prairie Star 1995, p.26[A]), 
In 1995, the results of a $4.5 million seven-state 
study about sustainable farming were released by the St, 
Paul-based North'west Area Foundation. Research activities 
were conducted by multi-disciplinary teams of academic 
researchers at land-grant universities Vv'orkincj in 
cooperation with farm groups and farmers in Minnesota, Iowa, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, and Oregon, 
The study vas coordinated by the Center for Rural Affairs, 
Waltill, Nebraska (Ibid, p.24[A]), 
According to this largest ever multi-state study, 
sustainable farming is better for the environment and can be 
economically competitive with conventional agriculture, 
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This v/as determined by comparing the economic, 
environmental, and social impacts of sustainable agriculture 
to conventional agriculture, Additionally, this emerging 
farm management technology can contribute to the economic 
revitalization of rural communities while preserving the 
environment. However, the study reports, these potential 
benefits v/ill not be realized without changes in policy 
(Ibid, p.24[A]). 
Among the measurable environmental benefits of 
sustainable agriculture are reduced toxins in soil and 
water, less erosion, enhanced wildlife habitat, and lower-
energy use, Instead of relying on purchased inputs, 
sustainable farmers rotate crops, recycle plant nutrients 
and manure, and plant more soil-burning crops than do 
conventional farmers. They also use more cover crops, strip 
crops, contour grass waterv^ays, and field windbreaks to 
conserve moisture for crop production and reduce soil 
erosion. As a result these farms use less commercial 
fertilizer, pesticides, and energy. 
Socioeconomic research conducted as part of the study 
indicates that sustainable agriculture can provide new 
farming and business opportunities for people in rural 
communities. But to take advantage of many of these 
opportunities, local business infrastructure must respond to 
the different production and market needs of sustainable 
farmers (Ibid, p.24[A]), 
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Some of the study's other findings indicated that 
sustainable farms are likely to be smaller than conventional 
farms, but sustainable farmers are likely to own a greater 
portion of the land they farm. In addition, it was found 
that conventional farmers are discouraged from adopting 
sustainable agriculture primarily from fear of reduced 
yields, more labor, and lower income. But those who had 
converted reported that many of these concerns were reduced 
as their experience with sustainable agriculture grev,' (Ibid, 
p.26[A]). 
During the late 1980s, a Department of Agriculture 
study examined a possible transition from conventional to 
sustainable agriculture. The findings indicated that a 
widespread shift to sustainable farming would increase net 
farm income, lov/er farm debts, reduce soil erosion and 
nutrient depletion, meet domestic food needs, reduce oil 
imports, and lov/er the environmental impact of agriculture. 
However, such a switch would also lead to a sharp reduction 
in the sales of fertilizers and pesticides; thus, it vrould 
be strongly opposed by the politically pov/erful agricultural 
chemical industry (Miller 1988, p,259). 
In addition to sustainable farming being touted as a 
new direction for agriculture, much has been v/ritten about 
organic farming. This segment of agriculture has posted 
sales increases of more than 20 percent a year for six 
straight years, making organic farming the fastest growing 
segment of the food industry. The U.S, organic industry 
69 
racked up sales of $2,3 billion in 1994, an all time high. 
But organic foods still represent only a tiny-if growing-
slice of the $600 billion spent annually on food in the 
United States (Henkes 1995, p.12). 
At this point it might seem that there are some trends 
which give hope to potential family farmers. Although 
federal policies offer little, in this regard, there have 
been reactions at other levels. The ensuing segment 
explores a number of these responses. 
Alternatives Generated by the State and Private Sector 
The diminished role of the federal government, in terms 
of policies to aid family farmers, has created a vacuum 
wherein state and local governments have intervened, 
Additionally, in regards to farmland preservation, the U,S, 
lacks a clear national policy. Therefore state and local 
governments have stepped in an attempt to protect long-term 
interests in farmland and, in some cases, assist potential 
family farmers (Nelson, 1992 p,484). 
As of 1995, every state has enacted laws which seek to 
ease the tax burden on farmers by granting preferred 
treatment to agricultural land. Unfortunately, to expect 
differential, property-tax assessment alone to contribute a 
great deal to the preservation of farmland has proven unduly 
optimistic (Santana, 1995 p.l). 
For example, the state of Colorado created a task force 
to examine agricultural land conversion and develop 
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recommendations for state action. The commission found that 
since 1978. Colorado farmland has declined by 90,000 acres a 
year,, equivalent to a path one mile wide and 140 miles long 
(Colorado Department of Agriculture, 1995 p,l). 
The study Vs^hat 1 i Ahead for Colorado's AC7 Lands? 
recommended many possible courses of action. On the federal 
level, the commission recommended that the federal 
government increase incentives for conservation easements. 
It was also suggested that expanded assistance be given to 
beginning farmers and ranchers (Ibid, p.3), However with 
the passage of the "freedom to farm" bill, Colorado can 
novv' expect no help from the federal government, 
Yet, there is still hop© at the state level. Oregon's 
statewide land use program is described as the most fully 
integrated and comprehensive in the country. Oregon has 
mandatory planning standards. Agricultural lands must be 
preserved and maintained for farm use. Additionally, soils 
classified as I-IV, the top half of a soil scale, have to be 
zoned for agricultural use (Santana, 1995 p.3), Another 
facet of Oregon's effort to preserve prime farmland has been 
aimed primarily at preventing the occupation of those lands 
by hobby farmers (Nelson, 1992 p.473). 
The results have been viev/ed favorably. Data from the 
United States Department of Agriculture, in its 1987 Census 
of Agriculture, strongly suggests that Oregon's prime 
f.armland preservation policies seem to vrork (Ibid, p. 475 ). 
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V^/ithin the private sector a new development has 
unfolded,, known as a conservation easement, A conservation 
easement is a written agreement between the landowner and a 
land trust. It protects the special features of the 
property and places restrictions on certain uses of their 
land (primarily subdivision) in exchange for either federal 
tax benefits or remuneration. At the same time, the land 
remains in private ov^nership and the land trust assures the 
terms of the agreement are followed in perpetuity (Bay, 1996 
p . 17 ) . 
By 1994, there were over 1,000 land trusts in the 
nation, with a growth rate of about one a week. Using 
conser-vation easements primarily, over four million acres of 
farmland was protected from development by local trusts 
(Ibid, p.17). Ironically enough, the first local land trust 
was established in 1980 in California (Santana, 1995 p,3). 
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that private land 
trusts, in conjunction v/ith policy changes at the state and 
local level, have created some opportunities for aspiring 
family farmers. However, v/hile these developments are 
promising, they only affect a small percentage of the 
overall farmland inventory. Unfortunately, at the federal 
level, the passage of the 1995 farm bill demonstrates that 
there will be no such change in national policy in the 
foreseeable future. 
At this point the future of the family farm seems 
fairly well defined. The ensuing chapter offers some final 
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remarks on the overall standpoint of the family farm in the 
late tVv'entieth century 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose behind writing this thesis was to obtain a 
better understanding of the ©vents that have unfolded that 
make it almost impossible for younger people to gain entry 
into agriculture as an ov/ner/operator. If previous 
generations could become farmers, why v^as entry almost 
completely denied to current and future generations? Of 
course the obvious answer v/as because one lacks the 
necessary capital to make the investment, However, people 
attempting to gain entry into agriculture in the late 
twentieth century do not have the same opportunity as 
previous generations dating all the way back to the 
Revolutionary era. Vi/hy had this changed? 
In turn it seemed as if a fundamental freedom had been 
lost, the freedom to farm. Previous generations had this 
option, future generations do not, Hov/ did this all happen 
and what did it mean? This thesis set out to answer these 
questions, 
In order to begin answering the question the focus 
turned to the late 1970s, At that time, agricultural policy 
had become the focus of attention as a result of the 
deteriorating economic situation many farmers v^ere finding 
themselves in. The federal policies of the mid 1970s sought 
to maximize production. Concurrently the federal gov-ernment 
had encouraged farm debt by extending credit at rates lower 
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than those found in the private sector. However, by the 
late 1970s, the combination of overproduction and 
deteriorating export markets were creating business 
conditions disastrous for many farmers, In response to 
this, President Carter commissioned a study to examine this 
situation and make recommendations for future policymakers. 
Unfortunately, this happened at the end of his Presidency 
and Carter v^as unable to implement any of the recommended 
poli cy changes, 
Hov/ever the one point that the study did make clear v/as 
that there was a choice to be made. Continuing past 
programs and policies, largely unchanged, would lead to 
massive changes in the structure of agriculture. It would 
lead to a small number of producers, largely corporations, 
controlling nearly all agricultural output. In contrast to 
that, implementing new policies, recommended by the report, 
v/ould encourage a return to small scale farming in the 
•Jeffersonian vision. 
President Reagan continued past agricultural policies, 
largely without change, until 1986, For example the PIK 
program solved a short term overproduction problem, but it 
was the same Depression-born policy of paying farmers not to 
produce v/ith a new wrinkle, paying farmers from already 
existing commodity stockpiles rather than cash. 
At the same time, the high dollar, high interest rate 
situation, created by Reagan's deficit spending, spelled 
doom for many farmers who had borrowed extensively in the 
75 
19 70s, Thus farmers, v/ho v/ere encouraged to borrov/ by the 
government in the 1970s, were devastated by the economic 
situation of the early 1980s, When Congress implemented 
policy changes to react to this predicament, it took a court 
order to fore© Agriculture Secretary John Block to comply. 
The 1980s drastically altered the face of agriculture, 
as predicted in A Time to Choose. The family farm had 
managed to last longer than other decentralized forms of 
production, but in the end, that just seemed to make its 
demise more sudden, 
Following the Reagan years, agricultural policy was not 
much of an issue in either the 1988 and 1992 presidential 
elections. Thus, not surprisingly, the trends established 
in the 1980s continued largely unchanged. Farms proceeded 
to grow in size and their ov/nership continued to 
consolidate. At the same time, industrial agribusiness 
extended its control over agricultural production and 
output, 
The ramifications of the transition from family farming 
to industrial agribusiness are far-reaching and numerous, 
Perhaps the most disturbing trend has been the problems 
associated with the chemicals considered essential to 
industrial agribusiness. The fertilizers, insecticides, 
herbicides, and pesticides have contributed mightily to 
nonpoint source pollution. Not only are these chemicals 
being discovered in well water, they have also been found in 
streams and rivers. Because megafarms rely on larger and 
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larger machinery to till their ever-growing farms, the 
dependence on these petroleum based chemicals to control 
unwanted pests and weeds has grown as well, Furthermore, 
the huge machinery and associated petrochemicals all are 
dependent on the finite resource oil. 
The livestock industry faces similar issues. Huge 
feedlots for cattle, giant barns for chickens, and enormous 
hog operations have all created additional concerns. The 
tremendous amounts of animal v/aste create odor problems for 
surrounding neighbors. Furthermore, water pollution, both 
in groundwater and streams, has plagued these entities. 
An even greater concern involves the soil essential to 
all agriculture. Industrial agribusiness farming methods 
are the most conducive to soil erosion. By using the 
farming methods employed by agribusiness, soil is 
ef fectively being mined, Obviously this can only go on for 
so long. 
At the same time, government policy has exacerbated 
this situation, In the 1930s soil erosion was a top 
priority and government policy encouraged farmers to adopt 
tillage techniques to prevent it. In the 1970s these 
procedures were discarded as government policy changed to 
encourage maximum production. Then, in the 1980s, soil 
erosion rates once again became a concern and the CRP v/as 
implemented to eliminate farming on land v^rith high soil 
erosion rates. Now in the 19 90s, the CRP has been abandoned 
and federal policy encourages production, once again, on 
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land just recently taken out of cultivation. Of course what 
the future holds is a mystery, since v/ith the passage of the 
1995 farm bill the government will no longer be involved in 
agriculture as of 2002, 
Another outgrowth of the transition from family farming 
to industrial agribusiness evolved as well. Borrowing from 
the model established in the poultry sector, the cattle, 
hog, and grain industries have all come to be dominated by a 
handful of corporations. Documented extensively in A Time 
to Choose. the backward and forward integration in the 
poultry trade, by these corporations, has been reported to 
be occurring in these other industries as v^ell , 
Concurrently, the cattle markets are being investigated to 
determine if laws concerning monopolies have been violated. 
Additionally, the effects, predicted in a number of 
studies have been demonstrated concerning rural poverty. 
The overall economic impact of the industrialization of 
agriculture has been felt by both individuals and 
communities. The .Jeffersonian landowner/farmer has been 
replaced by a lovv' wage hourly employee who has little hope 
of owning a farm. At the same time, the communities 
formerly made up of small farmers have slowly dissipated in 
conjunction with the disappearance of the former landowners, 
Meanv^hile, there have been a number of reactions to the 
transition from family farming to industrial agribusiness. 
One of these developments involves what has con^e to be 
called sustainable farming, Sustainable farming offers many 
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ansv/ers to the problems associated v/ith industrial 
agr ibusiness. These farms tend to be smaller, v/holly or 
partially owned by the farmer, and resource conserving, 
They rely on less of the petrochemicals so essential to 
industrial agribusiness, and, in turn, do not suffer from 
the associated problems. The farming methods rely on 
rotating crops and other traditional techniques which have 
been shown to be soil conserving, instead of erosive. 
Additionally, the researchers found that these farms 
contribute to the economic revitalization of rural 
communi ties, 
Organic farming is another option to industrial 
agribusiness. Representing the fastest growing segment in 
agriculture, these farms have much in common with 
sustainable farms. They tend to be small, owner-operated, 
resource conserving operations However both organic farms 
and sustainable farms would need substantial assistance in 
the form of redirected agricultural policy to begin to 
compete for a major share of overall agricultural output. 
Unfortunately, the 1995 farm bill did not provide this 
support, 
Yet there has been a small ray of hope for family 
farmers. It has appeared in the private sector as well as 
at the state and local government level, Either through 
state land-use planning laws, or conservation easements, 
some farmland has been preserved. Because the land cannot 
be developed, it is not likely to attain a value greater 
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than can be paid for it by being farmed. Consequently, 
potential family farmers can buy these properties and have a 
reasonable chance of making it, Obviously, corporations can 
compete for these lands as well, but often the easements, or 
state laws, favor the family farmer. 
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that at the federal 
level the Jeffersonian model of a country founded on the 
not ion of the yeoman farmer has reached it's demise. During 
Jefferson's time he warned the nevv' American republic against 
the unequal distribution of land. .Jefferson argued that 
''the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so 
much misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot 
invent too many devices for subdividing property'' (Strange 
1388, p.274 ) . 
In contrast to that, federal policy nov/ resembles the 
policy Jefferson forewarned against. Perhaps the most 
pov/erful observation concerning agricultural policy comes 
from farmers themselves: ''In effect, the farm community is 
admitting that if farm policies were designed to preserve 
the mid-sized operator—that ''family farmer'' v/ho has been 
central to the American experience since Thomas Jefferson's 
time—it has failed'' (Margolis 1994, p,l[A]), 
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